By Yin Xiaoliang
Since the end of World War II, Japan has habitually portrayed itself as a “victim of nuclear weapons,” while rarely engaging in serious reflection on the fact that it was once an attempted “nuclear perpetrator” during the war.
During World War II, in pursuit of its expansionist ambition to “project national might far and wide,” Japan competed fiercely with the United States and Britain in the race to develop atomic weapons, hoping to secure victory in its war of aggression through such means. The Japanese army and navy each conducted separate atomic bomb research programs, both of which ultimately failed before the end of the war.
In November 1945, the U.S. military dismantled Japan’s nuclear research infrastructure, notably disposing of a critical cyclotron in Tokyo Bay. This action prevented what could have been catastrophic global consequences had Japan’s militarist regime acquired nuclear arms earlier.
Japan’s pursuit of nuclear armament did not vanish with its wartime defeat; rather, like a dormant seed, it has been quietly embedded in the consciousness of right-wing elements in Japan.
Recently, senior Japanese officials have hinted at possibly revising the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” claimed they do not rule out introducing nuclear-powered submarines, and even argued that Japan should possess nuclear weapons.
These remarks are not isolated political rhetoric but sensitive indicators of Japan’s accelerating shift in security strategy. They clearly reveal that the “nuclear option,” long treated as a taboo in Japan’s postwar political discourse, is now being pushed into open political debate while continuously testing and eroding established boundaries. The international community should see through the profound strategic intentions behind Japan’s shift in nuclear weapons policy.
Japan is breaching the postwar framework in pursuit of becoming a “military power.” Over the years, Japan’s right-wing forces have persistently sought to cast off constraints and expand military capabilities. Nuclear policy discussions aim to weaken postwar system restraints and accumulate political capital for revising the “pacifist constitution.”
Japan is probing the boundaries of policy by gauging public reactions. By making audacious assertions such as “Japan should possess nuclear weapons” and engaging in exploratory discourse, Japanese politicians aim to evaluate the real-world resistance and room for maneuver regarding nuclear armament based on domestic and international public opinion, thereby preparing the public opinion groundwork for subsequent policy adjustments.
Japan aims to bolster its independent deterrent capabilities and reshape the division of roles within the Japan-U.S. alliance. Never fully trusting in its ally across the Pacific, Japan regards “independent nuclear armament” as a potential means to reduce its reliance on the alliance while enhancing its own deterrent strength.
Furthermore, Japan’s right-wing forces are eager to expand their involvement in nuclear-related discussions within the alliance, gradually increasing their bargaining power within the framework of allied nuclear deterrence.
Japan is building offensive capabilities to exert strategic pressure on neighboring countries. By strengthening military deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and surrounding areas, Japan seeks to influence the strategic judgments and room for maneuver of neighboring countries, thereby positioning itself more favorably in the regional balance of power.
Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” established as a national policy after World War II, represent both a product of Japan’s reflection on its wartime aggression and a solemn commitment to peace upon its return to the international community.
Rooted in the tragic memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and shaped under the unique circumstances of Cold War confrontation, these principles were intended to serve as Japan’s self-imposed restraint against militarism and a security assurance to its Asia-Pacific neighbors.
Any attempt by Japan to revise the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” would not only shake the very foundation of its own nuclear policy but also pose a direct challenge to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Such a move would seriously destabilize world peace and significantly increase the risk of nuclear proliferation.
As stated in an ancient Chinese text, “If later generations lament without learning from the past, they will in turn be lamented by those who come after.”
Safeguarding the seriousness and integrity of the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” is a responsibility Japan must bear to history, to the region, and to future generations. Japan should draw lessons from its own experience of atomic bombings and conduct a thorough reflection on the profound suffering inflicted by Japanese militarism on the peoples of Asia, rather than playing the “victim card” to revive its old dream of nuclear armament.
Peace and prosperity in East Asia must be nurtured and safeguarded jointly by all countries in the region. Any attempt by Japan to approach or cross the “nuclear red line” constitutes a serious threat to the well-being of people across East Asia. The international community must remain vigilant against any move by Japan toward rearmament with nuclear weapons and work together to curb the spread of “neo-militarism.”
(Yin Xiaoliang is a professor at the Research Center for the History of Modern World and the Japan Institute at Nankai University.)
World must remain highly vigilant against Japan’s renewed nuclear ambitions
